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THE END OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
ABORTION FUND
PAUL STAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rosie J. v. N.C. Department of Human Resources,' the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that there was no state con-
stitutional right to state funded abortions. The opinion of the
court was straightforward. Effective July 1, 1995, the North Caro-
lina General Assembly had restricted eligibility for payment from
the state abortion fund to cases where the pregnancy resulted
from "cases of rape or incest, or to terminate pregnancies that, in
the written opinion of one doctor licensed to practice medicine in
North Carolina, endanger the life of the mother".2
The plaintiffs in the case, which included the pseudonymous
plaintiff, "Rosie J.," an abortion clinic, Raleigh Women's Health
Organization, and a doctor who performs abortions, John Marks,
claimed that abortions financed by the state were guaranteed in
four sections of the North Carolina Constitution including under
the "life, liberty" clause,3 the "law of the land" clause,4 the "equal
protection" clause, 5 and the clause creating a public welfare
board.6
Judge Henry Hight dismissed the complaint in Durham
County Superior Court on February 19, 1996 for failure to state a
claim. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted discretionary
* Paul Stain practices with the Apex law firm of STAM, FORDHAM &
DANCHI, P.A. He filed an amicus curiae brief for North Carolina Right to Life,
Inc. in Rosie J. v. N.C. Department of Human Resources, 347 N.C. 247, 491
S.E.2d 535 (1997). He holds a B.S. with High Honors from Michigan State
University and the J.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In
1989-1990 he was a member of the North Carolina House of Representatives.
1. 347 N.C. 247, 491 S.E.2d 535 (1997).
2. The Expansion and Capital Improvements Appropriation Act of 1995, ch.
507, Section 23.8A, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525, 1661.
3. N.C. Const. art. I, § 1 (1970).
4. N.C. Const. art. I, § 19 (1970).
5. Id.
6. N.C. Const. Art. XI, § 4 (1970).
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review prior to determination in the Court of Appeals.7 Justice
John Webb, writing for six of the seven justices, first held that
there was no constitutional right to have the state pay for medical
care.' The court had recently found a state constitutional right to
a sound and basic education.9 However, that decision was based
on explicit textual provisions within the North Carolina Constitu-
tion, therefore it was not analogous to the debate surrounding
state financed abortions. The North Carolina Supreme Court held
that, because indigent women are not a suspect class and the
encouragement of childbirth is a legitimate governmental objec-
tive, the state may encourage childbirth by refusing to fund abor-
tions.1 ° Although the North Carolina Supreme Court did not rely
on any federal court cases, it noted that its decision was consistent
with a long line of decisions of the United State Supreme Court,
including Harris v. McRae" and Maher v. Roe. 2
In her dissent, Justice Parker wrote that under the equal pro-
tection clause of the North Carolina Constitution, 3 the state's pol-
icy of refusing to fund "medically necessary" abortions for
Medicaid eligible women, while funding all other medically neces-
sary treatments incident to pregnancy, impermissibly interfered
with a pregnant woman's right to choose abortion without unduly
burdensome governmental interference. 4
In Rosie J., the North Carolina Supreme Court brought to full
circle a twenty-year odyssey in North Carolina law. In 1967,
North Carolina became the second state in the nation to remove
meaningful restrictions on abortions performed by doctors. 15 In
1977, Congress adopted the Hyde Amendment, severely limiting
federal funding of Medicaid abortions.' 6 In 1978, North Carolina
became the only state in the South to begin a fund for payment of
7. Rosie J. v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, No. 232PA96, 476
S.E.2d (N.C. 1996).
8. 347 N.C. at 251, 491 S.E.2d at 537.
9. Leandro v. North Carolina, 346 NC 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
10. Rosie J., 347 N.C. at 251, 491 S.E.2d at 537.
11. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
12. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
13. N.C. Const. Art. I, § 19 (1970).
14. Rosie J., 347 N.C. at 252, 491 S.E.2d at 538 (Parker, J., dissenting).
15. Act of May 9, 1967, ch. 367, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 394.
16. 112 Stat. 2681-385, Public Law 105-277, Section 508 and 509,
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, October 21, 1998 is the current version.
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elective abortion.' 7 This fund for all practical purposes, ended in
1995.1s
The plaintiffs in Rosie J. were unable to find any basis for
their argument that the right to state funded abortions is guaran-
teed in the North Carolina Constitution. This Article supports the
court's position that there is no state constitutional right to state
funding of abortion. It focuses on three areas often neglected by
appellate courts. First, this article will look at the legal environ-
ment in which the Constitution of 1868 was adopted. As of 1868,
the law of North Carolina would have been hostile to a claim of a
right to abortion or a right to state funding of abortion. Abortion
rights litigants offer several state cases as precedent for their posi-
tion. Next, this article will demonstrate that many of these cases
are not persuasive or are distinguishable. Those few decided on
state constitutional grounds include persuasive dissents or are
based on logical fallacies. By focusing on state court decisions in
favor of their position, abortion rights litigants misdirect the
courts from the fact that the great majority of American states do
not pay for state funded abortions, except to the very limited
extent required by federal law, and have not suffered a known
legal challenge on state constitutional grounds. And finally, the
history of North Carolina's State Abortion Fund will be examined
along with the term "medically necessary," often used by courts, in
the context of abortion funding.
II. OVERVIEW OF NORTH CAROLINA'S LEGAL HISTORY RELEVANT
TO CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1868
Constitutional provisions should be construed in consonance with
the objects and purposes in contemplation at the time of their
adoption ... A Court should look to the history, general spirit of
the times, and the prior and the then existing law in respect of the
subject matter of the constitutional provision under
consideration." 19
17. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-23 (1978).
18. See The Expansion and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of
1995, ch. 507, Section 23.8A, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525, 1661; Continuation
Budget Operations Appropriations Act of 1995, ch. 324, Section 23.27, 1995 N.C.
Sess. Laws 660, 751.
19. Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 444, 75 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1953).
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A. North Carolina Criminal Law and Abortion
In 1859, Horatio R. Storer of Boston reported for the Commit-
tee on Criminal Abortion of the American Medical Association and
obtained unanimous adoption of a resolution condemning the act
of procuring abortion at every period of gestation, except as neces-
sary for preserving the life of either mother or child.20 The reason
for the resolution was stated to be the increasing frequency "of
such unwarrantable destruction of human life."21 In 1868, Francis
Wharton urged the injustice of the quickening distinction in abor-
tion statutes and argued that the unborn child should be protected
regardless of gestational age.22
North Carolina did not have an abortion statute at the time,
due to the fact that the common law incriminated abortion from
the time of conception. In the first hearing of State v. Slagle,23
Judge Ashe held that abortion was a misdemeanor at common law
and quoted with approval from Wharton. "It has been said it is
not an indictable offense... unless the mother is quick with child,
though such a distinction, it is submitted, is neither in accordance
with the results of medical experience or with the principles of the
common law."24 In the second hearing of Slagle,25 Chief Justice
Smith reiterated the prior holding that abortion was a common
law misdemeanor and approvingly quoted the following: "The
moment the womb is instinct with embryo life and gestation has
begun, the crime may be perpetrated." 26
The common law to which the court made reference in 1880 is:
All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and
use within this state, or so much of the common law as is not
destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom
and independence of this State and the form of government
therein established, and which has not been otherwise provided
for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed or become obsolete,
are hereby declared to be in full force within this State.27
20. American Medical Association, Minutes of the Annual Meeting, 10 Am.
Med. Gazette 409 (1859).
21. Id.
22. 2 Wharton, American Criminal Law §1220-30, pages 210-218 (6th rev. ed.
1868).
23. 82 N.C. 653 (1880).
24. Id. at 655 (quoting 2 Wharton, American Criminal Law §1220, pages 210-
211 (6th rev. ed. 1868)).
25. State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630 (1880).
26. Id. at 632.
27. N.C. Gen. Stat. §4-1 (1986).
[Vol. 22:119
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This law has been held by the North Carolina Supreme Court
to be the common law of England as of the signing of the American
Declaration of Independence in 1776.2" When Judge Ashe, in
1880, held that abortion was a crime at common law and Chief
Justice Smith in 1880 stated that this was true at "the moment
the womb is instinct with life and gestation is begun,"29 the North
Carolina Supreme Court was not purporting to create a new
crime, but rather to recognize that abortion was a crime as of
1776.
B. Civil Rights of the Unborn Child in North Carolina
By 1868, North Carolina civil law, in contexts where it would
benefit the child, considered the child in esse30 to be protected
from the time of conception. Consider the law of intestate succes-
sion, wills, deeds and trusts. As to both realty and personalty, the
common law of North Carolina was that the property of an intes-
tate immediately vested in the child en ventre sa mere.a1 In Deal v.
Sexton,32 a partition proceeding had been brought and lands sold
thereunder. One of the ancestor's children, who was en ventre sa
mere at the time, was not made a party to the action.33 The lands
were sold to a bona fide purchaser for value who had no knowledge
of the existence of the unborn child.34 In securing the child's
inheritance, the court stated that:
If we hold, as we must, that the inheritance vested immediately in
the plaintiff while en ventre sa mere, upon the death of the father,
the conclusion must follow that such inheritance ought not to be
divested and the child's estate destroyed by judicial proceedings to
which it was in no form or manner a party; and for which not even
a guardian ad litem was appointed. It may be that our civil proce-
dure is defective in not providing for such contingencies, but that
is no reason why the vested estate of the unborn child in esse
should be taken from it. The general rule in this country and the
28. Gwathmey v. State, 342 NC 287, 464 S.E.2d 674 (1995).
29. Slagle, 83 N.C. at 632.
30. In esse is defined as "in actual existence, in being." Black's Law
Dictionary 780 (7' ed. 1999).
31. En ventre sa mere is defined as "in the mother's womb; refers to an unborn
child, usually in the context of a discussion of that child's rights," Black's Law
Dictionary 555 (7 th ed. 1999); See Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907)
(realty); Hill v. Moore, 5 N.C. 233 (1809) (personalty).
32. 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907)
33. Id.
34. Id.
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acknowledged rule of the English law is that posthumous children
inherit in all cases in like manner as if they were born in the life-
time of the intestate and had survived him, and for all the benefi-
cial purposes of heirship a child en ventre sa mere is considered
absolutely born. This has been the recognized law of this State
since Hill v. Moore, 5 NC 233, decided in 1809 ...... From most
remote times the common law of England regarded such child as
capable of inheriting direct from the ancestor as much so as if
born.3
5
In Grant v. Bustin,36 it was made clear that only posthumous
children en ventre sa mere at the time of death can take by inheri-
tance and those conceived after death but before time for distribu-
tion cannot. In Grant, a half-brother of the intestate, born ten and
a half months after her death but before distribution, claimed a
share along with his older brothers and sisters.3 7 The court was
careful to point out that the half brother did not claim that he was
en ventre sa mere at the date of death.38 Therefore, the court held
that:
the rule [ is that the right to the distributive share vests at the
death of the intestate. "It is said the rule is liable to an exception
in the case of a child in ventre sa mere. In truth, however, a child
in ventre sa mere is held capable of taking a distributive share,
because for all beneficial purposes it is in rerum natura, is
regarded as actually in esse." [citations omitted] The very reason
on which these adjudications are founded shows that one not in
being, and not considered as in being at the death of an intestate,
can, under the statute of distributions, prefer no claim to a share
of that intestate's estate. It is not stated in this case, nor can we
infer from the facts set forth, that Benjamin Bustin was in ventre
sa mere at the death of Patience Pitts, and we therefore hold that
he was not entitled to the distributive share claimed for him in her
personal estate.
3 9
In 1823, the General Assembly enacted a statute that said
"n]o inheritance shall descend to any person, as heir of the person
last seized, unless such person shall be in life at the death of the
person last seized, or shall be born within ten months after the
death of the person last seized."40 It was not enacted to affect the
35. Id. at 158-9, 56 S.E. at 692.
36. 21 N.C. 77 (1835).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 78.
39. Id. at 77-78.
40. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32 (1817 to 1825).
124 [Vol. 22:119
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common law rights of the child of the decedent en ventre sa mere
at his death. Its purpose, rather, was to prevent persons conceived
long after the death of the person last seized from claiming inheri-
tance as collateral relatives and thus leaving the title in indefinite
suspension.41 Current North Carolina law states that "[1]ineal
descendants and other relatives of an intestate born within ten
lunar months after the death of the intestate, shall inherit as if
they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had sur-
vived him."42 The normal length of pregnancy is 266 days.43 By
choosing ten lunar months as the cutoff, it is apparent that the
legislature wanted first, to provide some certainty as to titles and
second, to allow the child who is a collateral relative to take from
conception, with some margin of error for the late pregnancy. The
child of an intestate who is born more than 10 lunar months after
death of the intestate is still able to take by inheritance if he is
indeed the child of the intestate. The common law presumption
that pregnancy lasts only ten lunar months is a factual presump-
tion, which may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.44
In the case of wills, the common law held that a child, if con-
ceived, could take a vested interest under a devise to "children."
Several cases decided in North Carolina before the 1868 Constitu-
tion illustrate this principle.45 In Barringer v. Cowan,46 the
devise was to "the children of James L. Cowan."47 When the testa-
tor died, Cowan had three living children plus one in ventre sa
mere. 4 It was held that the afterborn child took a share as a child
of Cowan.4 9 In Flora v. Wilson,5 ° the testator devised lands to his
wife during widowhood and, upon her remarriage, to her heirs by
consanguinity. No children were born to the testator during his
lifetime. However, after his death, his widow remarried and gave
birth to a child sired by the testator. 1 It was held that, upon her
41. Byerly v. Tolbert, 250 N.C. 27, 31-34, 108 S.E.2d 29, 33-35 (1959).
42. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-9.
43. Keith Moore, The Developing Human, 82 (2d ed.1977)
44. Byerly, 250 N.C. at 35.
45. Flora v. Wilson, 35 N.C. 344 (1852); Barringer v. Cowan, 55 N.C. 436
(1856); (See also Petway v. Powell, 22 N.C. 308 (1839); Picot v. Armistead, 37
N.C. 226 (1842)).
46. 55 N.C. 436 (1856).
47. Id. at 437.
48. Id. at 438
49. Id. at 439.
50. 35 N.C. 344 (1852).
51. Id. at 345.
19991
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remarriage, the land vested in the child, en ventre sa mere, and, on
its death, descended to its heirs ex parte paterna.52
In the case of deeds, the situation is more complex. By 1868,
the unborn child was capable of taking a vested interest in prop-
erty by deed from conception. However, a question arose because
of the common law requirement that a deed must be delivered in
order to be valid. In Dupree v. Dupree," a conveyance of personal
property was executed on January 9, 1817 to "Washington and
Lewis Dupree, sons of Robert and Rachel Dupree, and to the next
of their heirs lawfully begotten of their bodies."54 On October 9,
1817, James Dupree was born to Robert and Rachel and claimed
an interest in the personal property. 5 The court denied his claim,
stating that in the case of chattels, actual delivery was neces-
sary. 6 While the court recognized that a conveyance under the
doctrine of uses or a conveyance by will could be made to an infant
en ventre sa mere as a thing in esse, it puzzled over the status of
the unborn as a grantee in a deed. The court in Dupree realized
that an unborn child could take on a use.5" But, it made a distinc-
tion between taking property by a common law conveyance and
taking it on a use.59
The General Assembly apparently thought little of the arid
reasoning in Dupree, which would allow an unborn child to take
by will, by trust, or by use, but not directly by deed. In 1854, it
enacted a remedial statute, which stated that "[a] n infant unborn,
but in esse, shall be deemed a person capable of taking by deed or
other writing any estate whatever in the same manner as if he
were born." 0 In Heath v. Heath,61 the North Carolina Supreme
Court recognized that G.S. 41-5 overruled Dupree as to unborn
children who were conceived at the time of the conveyance. As the
ability of the unborn child to take as beneficiary of a passive trust
is admitted in Dupree, such a child could also have a property
52. Id. at 346. Ex parte paterna is defined as "on the father's side," Black's
Law Dictionary 780 (7 th ed. 1999).
53. 45 N.C. 164 (1853).
54. Id. at 166.
55. Id. at 166-67.
56. Id. at 167.
57. Id. at 168-69.
58. Id. at 168.
59. Dupree, 45 N.C. at 168-69.
60. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-5 (1854).
61. 114 N.C. 547, 19 S.E. 155 (1894).
126 [Vol. 22:119
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right as a beneficiary of an active trust. In Gay v. Baker,6 2 a slave
was conveyed to a trustee for the benefit of Elizabeth Gay and her
children in common. At the time of the creation of the trust, Eliza-
beth Gay had given birth to four children.6" A fifth was born six
months afterward, and several more children were born subse-
quently.64 The court ruled that the first five children took as ten-
ants in common with their mother, but that those children not
even conceived at the time of the creation of the trust took noth-
ing.65 The court noted that allowing a conveyance of a use in
order to allow an unborn but conceived child to take a vested prop-
erty right was "an indirect adoption of the more humane and prac-
tical rule of the civil code, which regarded a child in the womb as
already born for all beneficial purposes."66
From the decisions in these cases, a conclusion can be drawn.
For all purposes beneficial to her, the unborn child was protected
by the law of North Carolina. By 1868, law and biology had con-
verged and considered the child in the womb to be within the pro-
tection of North Carolina law from the time of conception.
III. ORIGINAL INTENT OF NORTH CAROLINA'S CONSTITUTION
There is no historically relevant argument from the state con-
stitutional provisions that supports a claim for state paid abor-
tions. The North Carolina Constitution says nothing which
remotely supports a claim for abortions funded by the state. The
North Carolina Constitution provides: "We hold it to be self-evi-
dent that all persons are created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and
the pursuit of happiness."67 This provision was originally adopted
by the Constitutional Convention of 1868. The origin of Section I
of the Declaration of Rights6" is the original draft of the Declara-
tion of Independence of the United States. It does not seem likely
that, in 1776, the founders of the nation were contemplating a con-
stitutional right to state funded abortion. Nor does it seem feasi-
ble that the framers of the North Carolina Constitution of 1868
62. 58 N.C. 344 (1860).
63. Id. at 346.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 347.
66. Id.
67. N.C. Const. art. I, § 1.
68. Id.
1271999]
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contemplated state funded abortions when they proposed Article
I, Section 19, which provides:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold,
liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner
deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the law of the land.
No person should be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor
shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State
because of race, color, religion, or natural origin.69
This provision derives from the Constitution of 1868, but,
before that, it was Section 44 of the Constitution of 1776.70 Its
origins are rooted in the Magna Carta.7 1 It does not seem feasible
that the Barons 72 were asserting a constitutional right to govern-
ment funded abortions, or any state funded benefit, against King
John when they demanded that "[n]o free man shall be taken,
imprisoned, or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will
we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land."73
The plaintiffs in Rosie J., also relied on Article XI, Section 4 of
the North Carolina Constitution which states that a "[bleneficent
provision for the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan, is one of
the first duties of a civilized and a Christian state. Therefore, the
General Assembly shall provide for and define the duties of a
board of public welfare."74 It does not seem likely that the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1868 contemplated that Christian civiliza-
tion was dependent on the provision of state funded abortions.
These three provisions are of ancient vintage, ranging from
the time of the Magna Carta in 1215 A.D. to the Declaration of
1776 and on through the Constitutional Convention of 1868. That
the framers of these provisions would have intended a state con-
stitutional right to state funding of abortions challenges the imag-
ination. At the time these provisions were incorporated into our
Constitution, abortion was a crime at common law. And, for every
purpose beneficial to the unborn child, she had been held to be
within the protection of the law as soon as she was conceived.
Simply because the United States Supreme Court has subse-
quently transformed a crime into a protected liberty, and the Gen-
69. N.C. Const. art. I, § 19.
70. U.S. Const. art. I, § 44 (1776).
71. June 15, 1215 A.D. at Runnymede.
72. Assisted by Archbishop Stephen Langton of Lincoln Cathedral.
73. Magna Carta, Chapter 39 (1215 A.D.).
74. N.C. Const. art. XI, § 4.
[Vol. 22:119
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eral Assembly has conformed its criminal statute G.S. 14-45.111
under the Supremacy Clause, does not change the original intent
or the interpretation of these three state constitutional provisions.
IV. SIMILAR HOLDINGS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Several cases argue persuasively against a state constitu-
tional right for state funding of abortion. The decision of the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Rosie J. was not unique. In
Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare,76 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considered an abortion-funding restriction deny-
ing the use of state funds for abortion except where an abortion is
necessary to avert the death of the mother and in cases of rape
and incest. Justice McDermott, writing for the majority, acknowl-
edged the United States Supreme Court decision in Maher v.
Roe,77 which held that there was no constitutional requirement
for a state to accord equal treatment to both abortion and child-
birth, and that it was not unconstitutional for a state to pay for
the expenses of childbirth while at the same time refusing to pay
for therapeutic abortions.78
The Fischer court noted that in Harris v. McRae,9 the United
States Supreme Court held that Congress may limit the funding
of abortions to life-threatening situations, and that such restric-
tion does not contravene the constitutional rights of those indigent
women who seek abortions in less than life-threatening situa-
tions.8" The United States Supreme Court also held that a state
may even enact a statute prohibiting "medically necessary" abor-
tion funding.8 1 Justice McDermott noted that the United States
Supreme Court had found the congressional interest in protecting
potential life to be a rational basis for the Hyde Amendment, not-
ing that "abortion is inherently different from other medical proce-
dures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful
termination of a potential life."82 The Fischer court held that the
funding restriction violated none of the provisions of the state con-
stitution including: the "inherent rights of mankind," "no local or
75. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-45.1.
76. 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985).
77. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
78. Fischer, 502 A.2d at 118 (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 470).
79. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
80. Fischer, 502 A.2d at 118 (citing Harris, 448 U.S. 297.).
81. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
82. Fischer, 502 A.2d at 120.
1999] 129
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special law," its "Equal Rights" Amendment, and its "no discrimi-
nation" provision. 8
In Doe v. Department of Social Services,4 the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting the use of public
funds to pay for an abortion unless the abortion is necessary to
save the mother's life. 5 The Michigan Court held that the restric-
tion did not violate the Equal Protection clause. The court con-
cluded that:
there is no constitutional obligation on the state to remain neutral
regarding abortion any more than there is any obligation on the
state to remain neutral regarding the exercise of other fundamen-
tal rights. The state has a legitimate interest in protecting poten-
tial life, and it has a legitimate interest in promoting childbirth.
Equally important, the legislature has a legitimate interest in
allocating state benefits in a way that reflects its determination of
the public policy of the state. Our constitution does not require
that we have a government without values; it requires only that in
the pursuit of certain values, our government will not improperly
interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights. Because no
medical procedure besides abortion involves the deliberate termi-
nation of fetal life, and because of the high costs of childbirth and
the relatively lower cost of abortion, it is rational for the state to
pursue its legitimate interest by paying for childbirth, but not
abortion.
86
In concurrence, Justice Levin noted that only 7% of women
indicated that concern for their own health contributed to their
decision to have an abortion. 7 Of that 7%, only half said that a
doctor had told them that "their condition would be made worse by
being pregnant."8 Justice Levin went on to say that:
[ilt therefore appears that an abortion may be medically indicated
for less than 4% of the... pregnant women ... Obtaining funds to
pay for an abortion may be the least of the obstacles, or, in reality,
no substantial obstacle for the relatively few indigent women for
whom an abortion is medically indicated . . . Indeed, the entire
concept of government neutrality on the abortion/childbirth issue
is fallacious. The government must embrace one position or
another. It is at least [a] fair argument to say that the govern-
83. Id. at 120-24.
84. 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 179 (Levin, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 180-81 (Levin, J., concurring).
88. Id at 181 (Levin, J., concurring).
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ment would promote abortion by providing funding, even for a
medically indicated abortion. Such funding would offend those
who oppose abortion as much as a contrary result offends those
who favor choice. In short, there is no middle ground. The deci-
sion to promote "choice" is as much an expression of values as a
decision to promote childbirth. s9
In Doe v. Childers,9° a Kentucky trial court rejected a right to
state-funded abortion. The appeal was dismissed upon joint
motion of the parties. Therefore, the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in Rosie J. joins similar decisions in Penn-
sylvania, Michigan, and Kentucky that rejected the right of an
individual to a state funded abortion.
V. CONTRARY HOLDINGS FROM OTHER STATE COURTS
ARE DISTINGUISHABLE
Decisions of some state courts that recognize a state constitu-
tional right to state funding of abortion are not persuasive or are
distinguishable. The plaintiffs in Rosie J. alleged that a majority
of state courts had found a state constitutional right to state
funded abortion. This is misleading because it does not take into
account the great majority of states which, by statute, have
severely restricted or prohibited abortion funding, and these
restrictions have not been challenged. For example, Virginia pro-
hibits most state abortion funding. State funded abortions are
only allowed in cases of rape or incest, which have been reported
to a law enforcement or public health agency and in cases where a
fetus "will be born with a gross and totally incapacitating physical
deformity or with a gross and totally incapacitating mental defi-
ciency".91 A publication of the abortion industry shows South Car-
olina, Tennessee and Georgia using zero state dollars for abortion
and Virginia only funding 147 abortions in the fiscal Year of
1992.92
Abortion rights litigants have the ability to pick and choose
the states where they file challenges to bans on state abortion
funding. However, the great majority of states refuse to provide
state abortion funding, and their courts have not been asked to
89. Id at 181-85 (Levin, J., concurring).
90. No. 94 CI 02183, Ky. Cir. Ct. August 3, 1995.
91. See Virginia Code Annotated Section 32.1-92.1 and 92.2.
92. Public Funding of Contraceptive Services, 25 Family Planning
Perspectives 6 (November/December 1993) (Table 3, Reported Public
Expenditures for Abortions).
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find a state constitutional right to such funding. One report shows
32 states that restrict abortion funding in ways similar to or more
restrictive than North Carolina.93 This report is consistent with
the findings of National Right of Life Committee, Inc.
94
Several cases find a state constitutional right to funding of
abortion only because of prior decisions that there is a state con-
stitutional right to an abortion. The appellate courts of North
Carolina have never made such a decision independent of their
recognition that, under the Supremacy Clause, there is currently
a federal constitutional right to procure an abortion from a doctor.
In Women of Minnesota v. Gomez, 95 the Minnesota Attorney Gen-
eral conceded a fundamental right to obtain an abortion under the
Minnesota Constitution. 96 However, the decision in the Minnesota
case was a "narrow one," only holding that there is a state consti-
tutional right for funding for "therapeutic abortions" and not for
"abortion on demand."97 This is an illusory and constitutionally
insignificant distinction.98
The dissent by Justice Mary Jean Coyne points out the fallacy
of arguing for state funding of abortion based on the present legal-
ity of abortion. Justice Coyne stated in the dissent that:
[iun the present case, the majority promptly abandons all vestige
of neutrality. First, the majority frankly extols abortion as a posi-
tive good and the cure for all the ills from which a pregnant
woman could possibly suffer. Cloaking its discourse in the garb of
medical necessity and pregnancy by rape and incest, the majority
concludes that the right to decide without fear of criminal complic-
ity to have an abortion is the right to require the state to provide
abortion at taxpayer expense. 9
9
At bottom, the majority's quarrel is with the political reality:
selective funding. Although the magnitude of the national debt
may be thought to suggest otherwise, the government cannot fund
93. Who Decides, A State by State Review of Abortion and Reproduction
Rights, 8th Ed. (Nat'l Abortion and Reprod. Rights Action League, Washington,
D.C.) January, 1999, at 254-255.
94. State Funding of Abortion under the Federal Medicaid Program, (Nat'l
Right to Life Comm., Washington, D.C.) January 6, 1999, at 2-3 (listing 33 states
that limit use of public funds for abortion to the fullest extent allowed by federal
law).
95. 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995).
96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 32.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 142 - 144.
99. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 33 (Coyne, J. dissenting).
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everything-a proposition with which I presume every member of
this Court, as well as every citizen of this state, would agree. Gov-
ernment must be selective. For example, the freedom to engage in
interstate travel and to choose in what state one wishes to reside
is recognized as a fundamental constitutional right, but even
when a homeless Minnesotan whose frostbitten fingers and toes,
ears and nose prompt the desire to travel to a warmer clime, to
date it has not been suggested that the availability of Minnesota's
general assistance by the state declines to fund the purchase of a
bus, train, or airplane ticket, or to fill the gasoline tank of the fro-
zen indigent's automobile has impermissibly "coerced" the choice
to remain in Minnesota. The right of free speech does not compel
the government to purchase a newspaper or publishing house for
any citizen who wishes to be a publisher.100
Justice Coyne next addressed the supposed distinction
between therapeutic abortions and abortion on demand.
The repeated references in the majority opinion to health care
services and therapeutic abortions suggest an expectation that
only abortions necessitated by significant health considerations
will be state-funded, an implication articulated in the statement of
the holding: "[w]e [i.e., the majority] hold that the state cannot
refuse to provide abortion to MA/GAMC eligible women when the
procedure is necessary for therapeutic reasons." For two reasons,
however, I consider any such expectation doomed to failure. First,
there is the practical problem posed by the court's inability to set
any standard for determining when an abortion is "necessary for
therapeutic reasons." If a woman has decided that she does not
want the child and that she does not want to carry it to term, it
seems to me more than likely that she will find a physician who
will agree that the stress of continuing an unwanted pregnancy
justifies an abortion . . .[Second,] . . . [tihat the limitations the
court imposes are less restrictive than those set by the legislature
does not alter the fact that if financial considerations can be said
to "coerce" a decision in violation of a constitutional right to
decide, any restriction of state funding is "coercive" and, therefore,
violative of the fundamental right of privacy.10 1
In Woman's Health Center of West Virginia, Inc. v.
Panepinto,02 Justice McHugh, in dissent, noted that:
[iun fact, the majority's adoption of the "neutrality in funding"
principal could have a profound adverse impact on the indigent or
100. Id. at 36 (Coyne, J. dissenting).
101. Id. at 42 (Coyne, J. dissenting).
102. 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1993).
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others who seek government assistance. The frightening effect of
the majority's reasoning will be to chill government aid since it
would be virtually impossible financially to fund all competing
fundamental rights equally.103
The Panepinto Court relied on two West Virginia constitu-
tional provisions which do not exist in the North Carolina Consti-
tution, the "safety" provision and the "common benefit"
provision. 104
In Right to Choose v. Byrne, 10 the New Jersey Supreme
Court relied on an equal protection analysis and held that a right
to abortion was a fundamental right under the state constitu-
tion.10 6 North Carolina appellate courts have never so held. The
Byrne court distinguished, on state constitutional grounds, the
difference between medically necessary abortions and non-thera-
peutic abortions that do not implicate the health of the mother. 1
0 7
It then rendered this distinction illusory by placing that determi-
nation with the abortionist. "When an abortion is [considered]
medically necessary is a decision best made by the patient in con-
sultation with her physician without the complication of deciding
if that procedure is required to protect her life but not her
health."1 0 The Byrne court made this statement notwithstanding
its statement that elective non-therapeutic abortions may be
excluded. 0 9 It again stated "that the determination of medical
necessity [was] the proper province of physicians."' 1 0 Justice
Pashman, in a concurring opinion, noted that the majority's rea-
soning was equally applicable to a non-therapeutic abortion and
found the distinction not of constitutional significance. 1 '
In Moe v. Secretary of Administration,"2 Chief Justice Hen-
nessey pointed out in his dissent that the majority recognized the
state's. interest in protecting potential life.'1 3 Chief Justice Hen-
nessey noted "that one effective way in which the State can
advance this interest, aside from exercising its limited power to
103. Id. at 670 (McHugh, J. dissenting).
104. Id. at 663.
105. 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
106. Id. at 934.
107. Id at 935, n. 6.
108. Id.
109. Id at 937.
110. Id. at 938.
111. Byrne, 450 A.2d at 942 (Pashman, J., concurring).
112. 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
113. Id. at 407 (Hennessey, C.J. dissenting).
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regulate and prohibit abortion, is to provide disparate funding
which favors birth over abortion."114
In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,115 the
Supreme Court of California noted that, in 1969, it had recognized
a state constitutional right to an abortion. 116 North Carolina
appellate courts have never so held. In his dissent, Justice Rich-
ardson noted that:
[it] cannot [be] assume[d] that the California legislature is less
protective of potential life than is the United States Congress.
The Legislature also could assume that other women, no longer
able to obtain abortions paid for by the taxpayers, might be
encouraged before conception to discover and practice more effec-
tive birth control methods, thereby reducing to a considerable
degree public welfare expenditures. Thus, while the majority com-
pares the cost of abortions with the cost of childbearing ... it dis-
regards a third "procreative choice" available to the indigent
woman who prefers not to bear a child: use of effective contracep-
tion :. . A citizen clearly has a constitutional right to travel where
and when he pleases. I have never heard it suggested that he is
constitutionally entitled to a free trip to the Bahamas paid for
from the public treasury. Every citizen has a constitutional right
to vote, but he has no constitutional right to a free taxi ride to the
polling place." 7
In New Mexico Right to Choose/ NARAL v. Johnson,"8 Attor-
ney General Tom Udall filed an amicus curiae brief arguing
against his own state department's limitation on abortion funding.
The trial judge and the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the
New Mexico Equal Rights amendment, which provided "[elquality
of rights under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any
person."" 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court felt that, since Medi-
care generally covered services which were "medically necessary"
for men and women, it was unlawful gender discrimination not to
apply the standard of "medical necessity" to abortion. 20 In this,
the court succumbed to the logical fallacy known as the "fallacy of
the fourth term," which is assuming that a term used in two differ-
114. Id. (Hennessey, C.J. dissenting).
115. 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
116. Id at 784.
117. Id at 810 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
118. 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1256 (1999).
119. N.M. Const. art. II, § 18 (This provision is present neither in the U.S.
Constitution nor in the North Carolina Constitution).
120. Johnson, 975 P.2d at 855.
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ent contexts has an identical meaning. It is clear that, in the con-
text of abortion law, the term "medically necessary" is a term of
art, which is not remotely kin to either "medicine" or
"necessity". 1 2 1
The Idaho decision in Roe v. Harris'2 2 is inapposite because
the trial court merely struck down a regulation that was inconsis-
tent with an Idaho statute which did provide for abortion funding
in cases of danger to health or in cases of rape or incest. The
departmental regulation was inconsistent with the statute, and
that was enough to support the judgment. On appeal, the appel-
late court disapproved the rule in dicta in an opinion related to
attorney fees. 123
There are four trial court decisions, from Montana, Illinois,
Connecticut and Vermont, which required state abortion funding.
However, none of the cases were appealed and each of them can be
distinguished from the case of Rosie J.
The decision of the Montana district court in Jeannette R. v.
Ellery,"' is inapposite because it held that an administrative rule
violated an enabling statute. The District Court Judge held that
"the problem here is that the funding ban operates as a sort of
administrative Hyde amendment. The legislature can pass its
own Hyde amendment if it wishes; however, it exceeds the power
of the Department for it to limit the services provided by the legis-
lature."1 25 The rest of the Montana decision is dictum. The Mon-
tana trial court found a state constitutional right to abortion, a
finding that the appellate courts of North Carolina have never
made.
An Illinois trial court decision, Doe v. Wright, 26 is a hand-
written one page decision which contains no reasoning whatso-
ever, therefore it cannot be used as effective precedent. In Doe v.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 142 - 144. It is ironic that the New
Mexico Court relied on an "Equal Rights Amendment" to support abortion
funding. When the Federal Equal Rights Amendment was before the states for
ratification, ERA supporters assured lawmakers that the ERA "ha[d] nothing to
do with the power of states to stop or regulate abortions, or the right of women to
demand abortions." Thomas I. Emerson and Barbara G. Lifon, Should the ERA
Be Ratified? 55 Conn. B.J. 227, 232 (June 1981).
122. 917 P.2d 403 (Idaho 1996).
123. Id.
124. No. BDV-94-811 (Montana Dist. Ct., May 22, 1995).
125. Id. at 14.
126. No. 91 CH 1958, (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, Dec. 2, 1994)
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Maher, 127 the Connecticut trial court appears to base its holding
on a state constitutional right to an abortion, 128 a holding that the
appellate courts of North Carolina have never made. The Con-
necticut court took special pains to note that the existence of Con-
necticut's Equal Rights Amendment strengthened the plaintiffs'
case, 129 an amendment North Carolina has never adopted.
In Doe v. Celani,13 0 the Vermont trial court relied on a specific
Vermont constitutional provision which guaranteed the right to
"safety." The Constitution of North Carolina does not have such a
provision. The Vermont court struck down an administrative rule
as contrary to Vermont statute. In contrast, the North Carolina
funding prohibition is by direct act of the legislature, not an
administrative rule.
13 1
VI. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA'S ABORTION FUNDING
In 1977, James B. Hunt took office as Governor of North Caro-
lina for the first of four terms. 132 Later in 1977, Congress virtually
ended the practice of using federal taxes to pay for medically
unnecessary abortions through the Hyde Amendment 33 .
Governor Hunt created a State Abortion Fund13 4 , effective
February 1, 1978, to pay for medically unnecessary abortions for
the first twenty weeks of pregnancy. That spring, the Governor
took $250,000 appropriated by the legislature for mental health
and used these funds to pay for abortions. 135 Later, he requested
from the General Assembly $1 million per year for taxpayer
financed abortions. In 1979, he transferred $303,000 that had
been appropriated for rest homes and used that money to pay for
medically unnecessary abortions beyond the $1 million the Gen-
127. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. 1986).
128. Id at 150.
129. Id. at 157.
130. No. S81-84 CnC (Vt. Super. Ct., Chittenden County, May 26, 1986).
131. The Expansion and Capital Improvements Appropriation Act of 1995, ch.
507, Section 23.8A, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525, 1661.
132. Governor Hunt served his first two terms from 1977 to 1985, his third
term from 1993 to 1997 and as of this writing, he is serving his fourth term, 1997
to 2001.
133. 112 Stat. 2681-385, Public Law 105-277, Section 508 and 509,
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, October 21, 1998 is the current version.
134. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 42W (1978).
135. Dept. of Human Resources, Budget Transfer, code 24421-129 (Dept.
Human Resources, 1978), relying on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-23 (1978).
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eral Assembly had appropriated at his request.' 36 In 1980, Gover-
nor Hunt again needed more than the $1,000,000 the General
Assembly had provided. He transferred $367,000 from Aid to
Families with Dependent Children for tax paid abortions. 137 In
1981, he again needed to find more money for abortion and again
transferred $235,000 from Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren, which increased the abortion fund to $1,235,000.131
James Martin served two terms as governor from 1985 to
1993. During these years, abortion funding fluctuated. Abortion
finding was reduced to $924,000 from 1985 until 1989 and then to
$424,000 per year from 1989 to 1993. When James B. Hunt took
office again as Governor in 1993, abortion spending tripled at his
request with yearly totals of $1,212,000.00 until 1995.'13 In 1995,
the General Assembly, for all practical purposes, ended state abor-
tion funding and ended North Carolina's seventeen-year history
as the only southern state to pay for elective abortions.141
Prior to 1985, medically necessary abortions were explicitly
not funded by the state.14 1 Beginning in 1985 and continuing
thereafter until July 1, 1995, a "health impairment exception" was
included in the annual appropriations. 142 This exception was so
broad as to effectively allow abortion on demand since the sole
determinant was the description written by the doctor performing
the abortion. The diagnoses that were listed under the exception
included a vast majority of indications that are euphemisms for
"elective" or non-therapeutic abortion. For example, of the 3233
"health impairment" abortions in the fiscal year of 1987-1988,
1,931 were "non specific"; 208 were for "adjustment reaction"; 156
for "emotional problems"; 239 for "stress reactions". 143 As a conse-
quence of varying criteria and funding levels the number of abor-
136. Dept. of Human Resources, Budget Transfer, code 24421-271 and -279
(North Carolina State Budget, 1978), relying on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-23 (1978).
137. Dept. of Human Resources, Budget Transfer, code 14440-90 and - 120
(North Carolina State Budget, 1978), relying on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-23 (1978).
138. Dept. of Human Resources, Budget Transfer, code 14440-210 (North
Carolina State Budget, 1978), relying on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-23 (1978).
139. Office of the Governor, 1993-1995 Biennium Supp. Budget
Recommendations, at 46, n. 17 (North Carolina State Budget, 1993)
140. The Expansion and Capital Improvements Appropriation Act of 1995, ch.
507, Section 23.8A, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525, 1661.
141. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 42W (1978).
142. 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 479 § 93.
143. State Abortion Fund Diagnoses, July 1, 1987 - June 30, 1988.
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tions funded by the NC State Abortion Fund since its inception
are:
Fiscal Year No. of Abortions Fiscal Year No. of Abortions
1977 - 1978 1123 1988 - 1989 4137
1978 - 1979 6125 1989 - 1990 1921
1979 - 1980 6343 1990 - 1991 2330
1980 - 1981 5730 1991 - 1992 2156
1981 - 1982 4295 1992 - 1993 2132
1982 - 1983 6149 1993 - 1994 4448
1983 - 1984 6645 1994 - 1995 4587
1984 - 1985 6564 1995 - 1996 0
1985 - 1986 2662 1996 - 1997 1
1986 - 1987 4181 1997 - 1998 0
1987 - 1988 3600 1998 - 1999 0144
These numbers do not include the few abortions paid under the
federal Medicaid program. In 1997, public funds paid for 59 abor-
tions involving claims of rape, 2 cases involving incest, and 5 cases
involving danger to the life of the mother.145
VII. THE "MEDICALLY NECESSARY" DISTINCTION
The distinction between "medically necessary" and elective
abortions is illusory and not of constitutional significance. The
North Carolina Supreme Court in Stam v. State146 addresses
"medically unnecessary" abortions in the following terms: "[b]y no
stretch of the imagination can we consider medically unnecessary
abortions as 'essential to the health and welfare' of the recipi-
ents."147 "Medically unnecessary" abortions were the type of abor-
tion addressed in the opinion because "medically necessary
abortions" were not reimbursable in 1981.148
Despite the change in nomenclature, these are the same type
of abortions that abortion rights litigants desire to compel the
state to fund. "These women will likely suffer the social and eco-
nomic costs of compulsory childbirth. . ." and medical necessity
144. See P.J. Cook, The Effects of Short-Term Variation in Abortion Funding on
Pregnancy Outcomes, 18 Journal of Health Economics 241, 247 (April 1999).
145. Who Decides? A State-by-State Review of Abortion and Reproductive
Rights 1999 in North Carolina, 8th Ed. (Nat'l Abortion and Reprod. Rights
Action League, Washington D.C.) January, 1999, at 3.
146. 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981) (upholding state funded abortions
while ending county funding).
147. Id. at 360.
148. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 42W (1978).
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includes such concepts as "age," "genetic anomalies" (either "dis-
covered" or "suspected"), the "homeless," "those in abusive rela-
tionships," "addicted to drugs or alcohol," "young," or "living in
dysfunctional families."149
In Williams v. Zbaraz,5 ° the United States Supreme Court
demonstrated that there is no constitutional significance between
"medically necessary" abortions and any other type of abortion
when dealing with government funding. And the current version
of the federal Hyde Amendment contains no exception for "medi-
cally necessary" abortion greater in scope than the current North
Carolina legislation. 5 ' The Hyde Amendment provides as follows:
Sec. 508 (a) None of the funds appropriated under this Act
and none of the funds in any trust fund to which funds are appro-
priated under this Act shall be expended for any abortion. (b)
None of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be expended
for health benefits coverage that includes coverage of abortion. (c)
The term "health benefits coverage" means the package of services
covered by a managed care provider or organization pursuant to a
contract or other arrangement.
Sec. 509 (a) The limitations established in the preceding sec-
tion shall not apply to an abortion-(1) if the pregnancy is the
result of an act of rape or incest; or (2) in the case where a woman
suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical ill-
ness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or
arising from the pregnancy itself, that would, as certified by a
physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion
is performed. (b) Nothing in the preceding section shall be con-
strued as prohibiting the expenditure by a State, locality, entity,
or private person of State, local, or private funds (other than a
State's or locality's contribution of Medicaid matching funds). (c)
Nothing in the preceding section shall be construed as restricting
the ability of any managed care provider from offering abortion
coverage or the ability of a State or locality to contract separately
with such a provider for such coverage with State funds (other
149. Plaintiffs Brief at pages 7-8. It is noteworthy that Rosie J. complained
only of severe nausea. It is a fact that every pregnancy that goes to term will
either result in serious discomfort and pain or, in the case of a Caesarian section
delivery, will result in major surgery. If "medical necessity" for an abortion
includes Rosie J.'s nausea it would, a fortiori, encompass all pregnancies.
150. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
151. See 112 Stat. 2681-385, Public Law 105-277, Section 508 and 509,
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, October 21, 1998.
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than a State's or locality's contribution of Medicaid matching
funds). 152
After the Hyde Amendment was passed, some critics of it
argued that restricting state abortion funding would increase the
number of abortion related complications due to an increase [in
the number of women] that resort to illegal abortions. That pro-
jection did not materialize. In a natural comparison the Center
for Disease Control undertook a review of 600 consecutive hospital
charts of women in Texas with abortion related complications that
caused them to seek emergency medical care. Texas was one of
the then 31 states that ended the use of state funds for
abortion. 153
However, the argument did not follow. A review showed "no
increase after the restriction, compared to the time interval before
the restriction, in either the number or proportion of Medicaid or
Title XX - eligible women admitted for abortion complication.
1 54
VIII. CRITICISM
While the North Carolina Supreme Court's judgment is sound
in Rosie J., one part of the opinion needs to be clarified. The court
found there was a legitimate governmental objective of encourag-
ing childbirth.155 The individual child who is born to the mother
whose abortion is not paid by the state is now alive, and that
child's life, protected by Article I, Section 1 of the North Carolina
Declaration of Rights, should be a legitimate object of the court's
attention. But, whether denial of the tax funds for abortion
encourages childbirth in general is doubtful. If a permanent pro-
hibition on state abortion funding is in place, it probably reduces
pregnancies sufficiently to offset the number of births avoided.
To the extent that it is known in advance, the cost of
obtaining an abortion may also influence the initial decisions
regarding sex. The vast increase in abortions following legaliza-
tion in the early 1970s was associated with a far-smaller reduction
in births, indicating (together with direct evidence on sexual prac-
152. 112 Stat. 2681-385, Public Law 105-277, Section 508 and 509,
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, October 21, 1998.
153. Center for Disease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Vol.
29, No. 22, June 6, 1980.
154. Id.
155. Rosie J., 347 N.C. at 251, 491 S.E.2d at 537.
1999]
23
Stam: The End of the North Carolina Abortion Fund
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
tice) that there was a considerable 'moral hazard' effect from
legalization.
... For women who did not want a baby but were willing to
abort if pregnant, legalization reduced the expected cost of taking
a chance of becoming pregnant. The result was a large increase in
unwanted pregnancies.
A number of authors have pointed out a possible paradoxical
effect on birth rates. While reducing the cost of abortion reduces
the probability of birth given pregnancy, the pregnancy rate may
increase by enough to more than compensate ... Hence the effect
of abortion costs on the birth rate is indeterminate. 156
IX. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Supreme Court correctly held that there
is no state constitutional right to state funding of abortion. Such a
claimed right is contrary to the history of North Carolina law as it
related to the unborn child as of 1868. Persuasive authorities from
sister states do not recognize such a right. The majority of states
do not provide state funding of abortion beyond that provided by
North Carolina. The "medically necessary" formulation is illusory
and not constitutionally significant.
156. Cook, supra note 141, at 243, n. 84.
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